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Abstract
Techniques such as Federated Learning and Split
Learning aim to train distributed deep learning
models without sharing private data. In Split
Learning, when a neural network is partitioned
and distributed across physical nodes, failure of
physical nodes causes the failure of the neural
units that are placed on those nodes, which re-
sults in a significant performance drop. Current
approaches focus on resiliency of training in dis-
tributed neural networks. However, resiliency of
inference in distributed neural networks is less
explored. We introduce ResiliNet, a scheme for
making inference in distributed neural networks
resilient to physical node failures. ResiliNet com-
bines two concepts to provide resiliency: skip
hyperconnection, a concept for skipping nodes in
distributed neural networks similar to skip con-
nection in resnets, and a novel technique called
failout, which is introduced in this paper. Failout
simulates physical node failure conditions dur-
ing training using dropout, and is specifically de-
signed to improve the resiliency of distributed
neural networks. The results of the experiments
and ablation studies using three datasets confirm
the ability of ResiliNet to provide inference re-
siliency for distributed neural networks.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have boosted the state-of-the-
art performance in various domains, such as image classifica-
tion, segmentation, natural language processing, and speech
recognition (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Hinton et al., 2012;
LeCun et al., 2015; Sutskever et al., 2014). In certain DNN-
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empowered IoT applications, such as image-based defect
detection or recognition of parts during product assembly,
or anomaly behavior detection in a crowd, the inference
task is intended to run for a prolonged period of time. In
these applications, a recent trend has been to partition and
distribute the neural network over physical nodes along an
edge-to-cloud path (e.g. on edge servers) so that the forward-
propagation occurs on in-network while the data traverses
toward the cloud (Teerapittayanon et al., 2017; Tao and Li,
2018). This distributed DNN architecture is motivated by
two observations: Firstly, deploying DNNs directly onto
IoT devices for huge multiply-add operations is often infea-
sible, as many IoT devices are low-powered and resource-
constrained (Zhou et al., 2019a). Secondly, placing the
DNNs in the cloud may not reasonable for such prolonged
inference tasks, as the raw data, which is often large, has to
be continuously transmitted from IoT devices to the DNN
model in the cloud, which results in the high consumption
of network resources and possible privacy concerns (Jeong
et al., 2018; Teerapittayanon et al., 2017; Vepakomma et al.,
2019).
A natural question that arises within this setting is whether
the inference task of a distributed DNN is resilient to the
failure of individual physical nodes. Physical nodes could
fail due to power outages, cable cuts, natural disasters, or
hardware/software failures. Providing failure-resiliency for
such inference tasks is vital, as physical node failures are
more probable during a long-running inference task. Failure
of a physical node causes the failure of the DNN units that
are placed on the node, and is especially troublesome for IoT
applications that cannot tolerate poor performance while the
physical node is being recovered. The following question is
the topic of our study. How can we make distributed DNN
inference resilient to physical node failures?
Several frameworks have been developed for distributed
training of neural networks (Abadi et al., 2016; Paszke et al.,
2017; Chilimbi et al., 2014). On the other hand, inference
in distributed DNNs has emerged as an approach for DNN-
empowered IoT applications. Providing failure-resiliency
during inference for such IoT applications is crucial. Au-
thors in (Yousefpour et al., 2019). introduce the concept
of skip hyperconnections in distributed DNNs that provides
some failure-resiliency for inference in distributed DNNs.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
07
38
6v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
2 J
un
 20
20
ResiliNet: Failure-Resilient Inference in Distributed Neural Networks
Skip hyperconnections skip one or more physical nodes in
the vertical hierarchy of a distributed DNN. These forward
connections between non-subsequent physical nodes help in
making distributed DNNs more resilient to physical failures,
as they provide alternative pathway for information when a
physical node has failed. Although superficially they might
seem similar to skip connections in residual networks (He
et al., 2016a), skip hyperconnections serve a completely
different purpose. While the former aim at solving the van-
ishing gradient problem during training, the latter are based
on the underlying insight that during inference, if at least
a part of the incoming information for a physical node is
present (via skip hyperconnections), given their generaliza-
tion power, the neural network may be able to provide a
reasonable output, thus providing failure-resiliency.
A key observation in the aforementioned work is that the
weights learned during training using skip hyperconnections
are not aware that there might be physical node failures. In
other words, the information about failure of physical nodes
is not used during training to make the learned weights
aware of such failures. As such, skip hyperconnections by
themselves do not make the learned weights more resilient
to physical failures, as they are just a way to diminish the
effects of losing the information flow at inference time.
Motivated by this limitation, we introduce ResiliNet, which
utilizes a new regularization scheme we call failout, in ad-
dition to skip hyperconnections, for making inference in
distributed DNNs resilient to physical node failures. Failout
is a regularization technique that during training “fails” (i.e.
shuts down) the physical nodes of the distributed DNN,
each hosting several neural network layers, thus simulating
inference failure conditions. Failout effectively embeds a
resiliency mechanism into the learned weights of the DNN,
as it forces the use of skip hyperconnections during fail-
ure. The training procedure using failout could be applied
offline, and would not necessarily be done during runtime
(hence, shutting down physical nodes would be doing so
in simulation). Although in (Yousefpour et al., 2019) skip
hyperconnections are always active both during training and
inference, in ResiliNet skip hyperconnections are active dur-
ing training and during inference only when the physical
node that they bypass fails (for bandwidth savings). We also
study the case where bandwidth is not a concern, and skip
hyperconnections are always active.
Experimental results using three datasets show that ResiliNet
minimizes the degradation impact of physical node failures
during inference, under several failure conditions and net-
work structures. Finally, through ablation studies, we ex-
plore the hyperparameters of ResiliNet, including the rate of
failout and the weight of hyperconnections. ResiliNet’s ma-
jor novelty is in providing failure-resiliency through special
training procedures, rather than traditional “system-based”
approaches of redundancy, such as physical node replication
or backup.
2. Resiliency-based Regularization for DNNs
In this section we introduce the building blocks of the Resi-
liNet architecture, namely distributed neural networks, skip
hyperconnections, and failout regularization.
2.1. Distributed neural networks
A distributed DNN is a DNN that is split according to a
partition map and distributed over a set of physical nodes
(a form of model parallelism). This concept is sometimes
referred to as split learning, where only activations and gra-
dients are transferred in the distributed DNN, which results
in improvements in privacy (Vepakomma et al., 2019). This
article studies the resiliency of previously-partitioned dis-
tributed DNN models during inference. We do not study the
problem of optimal partitioning of a DNN; the optimal DNN
partitioning depends on factors such as available network
bandwidth, type of DNN layers, and the neural network
topology (Hu et al., 2019; Kang et al., 2017; Zhou et al.,
2019b). We do not consider doing any neural architecture
search in this article. Nevertheless, in our experiments, we
consider different partitions of the DNNs, and report their
performance.
Since a distributed DNN resides on different physical nodes,
during inference, the vector of output values from one phys-
ical node must be transferred (e.g. through a TCP socket)
to another physical node. The transfer link (pipe) between
two physical nodes is called a hyperconnection (Yousefpour
et al., 2019). Hyperconnections transfer information (e.g.
feature maps) as in traditional connections between neu-
ral network layers, but through a physical communication
network. Unlike a typical neural network connection that
connects two units and transfers a scalar, a hyperconnec-
tion connects two physical nodes and transfers a vector of
scalars. Hyperconnections are one of two types: simple or
skip. A simple hyperconnection connects a physical node
to the physical node that has the next DNN layer. Skip
hyperconnections are explained next.
2.2. Skip Hyperconnections
The concept of skip hyperconnections is similar to that of
skip connections in residual networks (ResNets) (He et al.,
2016a). A skip hyperconnection (Yousefpour et al., 2019) is
a hyperconnection that skips one or more physical nodes in
a distributed neural network, forwarding the information to
a physical node that is further away in the distributed neural
network structure. During training, the DNN learns to use
the skip hyperconnections to allow an upstream physical
node receive information from more than one downstream
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physical node. Consequently, during inference, if a physical
node fails, information from the prior working nodes are
still capable of propagating forward to upstream working
physical nodes via these hyperconnections. Skip hypercon-
nections already provide some failure-resiliency, as shown
by DFG framework described in (Yousefpour et al., 2019).
ResiliNet also uses skip hyperconnections, but in a slightly
different manner from the DFG framework. When there
is no failure during inference, or no failout during train-
ing (failout, to be discussed), the skip hyperconnections
are not active. When failure occurs during inference, or
failout during training, skip hyperconnections become ac-
tive. This setup in ResiliNet significantly saves bandwidth,
compared to DFG, which requires skip hyperconnections
to be always active. In Section 3 we will also show through
experiments that if skip hyperconnections are always active,
the performance only increases negligibly.
2.3. Failout Regularization
In the DFG framework (Yousefpour et al., 2019), the infor-
mation regarding failure of the physical nodes is not used
during training to make the learned weights more aware of
such failures. Although skip hyperconnections increase the
failure-resiliency of distributed DNNs, they do not make
the learned weights more prepared for such failures. This is
because all neural network components are present during
training, as opposed to inference time where some physical
nodes may fail. In order to account for the learned weights
being more adapted to specific failure scenarios, we intro-
duce failout regularization, which simulates inference-time
physical node failure conditions during training.
During training, failout “fails” (i.e., shuts down) a physical
node, to make the learned weights more adaptive to such
failures and the distributed neural network more failure-
resilient. By “failing” a physical node, we mean temporarily
removing the neural network components that reside on the
physical node, along with all their incoming and outgoing
connections. Failout’s training procedure could be done
offline, and would not necessarily be employed during run-
time. Therefore failing physical nodes would be temporarily
removing their neural network components in simulation.
When the neural components of a given physical node shut
down using failout, the neural layers of the upstream phys-
ical node that are connected to the failing physical node
will not receive information from the failing physical node,
forcing their weights to take into account this situation and
utilize the received information from the skip hyperconnec-
tion. In other words, failout forces the information passage
through the skip hyperconnections during training, hence
adapting the weights of the neural network to account for
these failure scenarios during inference.
Formally, consider a neural network which is distributed
over V different nodes vi, i P r1, V s, where for each vi, we
define its failure rate (probability of failure) fi P r0, 1s. Fol-
lowing this, we define a binary mask b with V components,
where its i-th element bi follows a Bernoulli distribution,
with a mean equal to 1´ fi, that is bi „ Berp1´ fiq. Dur-
ing training, for each batch of examples, a new mask b is
sampled, and if bi “ 0, the neural components of physical
node vi are dropped from computation (vi’s output is set to
zero in simulation), thus simulating a real failure scenario.
Although, superficially, this procedure seems similar to
dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014), failout removes a whole
segment of neural components, including neurons and
weights, and for an entirely different purpose of failure-
resiliency. However, in dropout, randomly selected neurons
are removed for regularizing the neural network.
Another important distinction between failout and dropout is
in their behavior during inference. In dropout, at inference,
the weights of connections are multiplied by the probabil-
ity of survival of their source neuron to account for model
averaging from exponentially many thinned models. Fur-
thermore, DNN units are not dropped during inference in
dropout, making the model averaging a necessity. In con-
trast, failout does not multiply weights of hyperconnections
by the probability of survival, since, during inference, phys-
ical nodes may fail, though not necessarily at the same rate
as during training. Said differently, failout does not use the
model ensemble analogy as used in standard dropout, hence
does not need the mixed results of the model ensembles.
To verify our hypothesis regarding failout, we conducted
experiments using different datasets in a setting where the
weights of hyperconnections are multiplied by the the prob-
ability of survival of the physical nodes, and we observed a
sheer reduction in performance.
3. Experiments
In this section we describe the experiment scenarios,
datasets, experiment setup, evaluation results, and abla-
tion studies for ResiliNet. We will compare ResiliNet’s
performance with that of DFG (Yousefpour et al., 2019) and
vanilla (distributed DNN with no skip hyperconnections
and no failout). We begin by describing the scenarios we
used for the experiments and their corresponding datasets.
3.1. Scenarios and Datasets
We evaluate the resiliency of our approach in two relevant
distributed DNN scenarios: vertically distributed MLP and
vertically distributed CNN. We first describe each of the
scenarios and the datasets used for each scenario.
Vertically distributed MLP: This is the simplest scenario
for a distributed DNN in which the MLP is split vertically
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Figure 1. Distributed neural
network setup and number
of layers on each node.
Config Health + Vanilla Health + dFG Health + ResiliNet
Low 55.66 75.33 88.16
Medium 75.58 86.69 94
High 86.57 92.21 95.88
No-Failure 97.86 97.91 97.03
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(a) Health Experiment
Hazardous Poor Normal NoFailure
Vanilla DFG ResiliNet
Config Camera + Vanilla Camera + dFG Camera + ResiliNet
Low 78.41 88.32 91.09
Medium 91.26 95.04 95.54
High 97.86 98.33 98.79
No-Failure 98.86 98.54 99.1
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(b) Camera Experiment
Hazardous Poor Normal NoFailure
Raw result (incorrect by keras)
imagenet + Vanilla imagenet + dFG imagenet + ResiliNet
0,0 0.1 0.1 0.1
0,1 0.1 3.23 37.41
1,0 0.1 7.3 41.94
1,1 58.5619 57.84 53.0
Low 39.854092 40.9628 47.662
Medium 50.0849245 50.29255 50.98325
High 55.10095552 54.764128 52.2248
No Failure 58.5619 57.84 53.0
Raw result corrected
imagenet + Vanilla imagenet + dFG imagenet + ResiliNet
0,0 0.1 0.1 0.1
0,1 0.1 10.23 46.41
1,0 0.1 14.3 52.94
1,1 65.0619 64.84 66.0
Low 44.274092 47.7528 59.452
Medium 55.6424245 57.25755 63.54825
High 61.21615552 61.758528 65.0592
No Failure 65.0619 64.84 66.0
Config imagenet + Vanilla imagenet + dFG imagenet + ResiliNet
Low 44.274092 47.7528 59.452
Medium 55.6424245 57.25755 63.54825
High 61.21615552 61.758528 65.0592
No Failure 65.0619 64.84 66.0
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(b) MobileNet Experiment
Hazardous Poor Normal NoFailure
Config resnet + Vanilla resnet + dFG resnet + ResiliNet
Low 66.8715896 75.2779844 77.5998442
Medium 80.9894727 84.3155412 84.5
High 87.9141416 89.1371939 88.24
No Failure 92.692013 92.377987 90.7
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(c) ResNet Experiment
Hazardous Poor Normal NoFailure
1
Figure 2. Average performance
across physical nodes shown in left of Fig. 1.
For this scenario, we use the UCI health activity classifica-
tion dataset (“Health” for short), described in (Banos et al.,
2015). This dataset is an example of an IoT application for
medical purposes where the inference task will run over a
long period of time. The dataset is comprised of readings
from various sensors placed at the chest, left ankle, and right
arm of 10 patients. There are a total of 23 features, each
corresponding to a type of data collected from sensors. For
this experiment, we split a DNN that consists of ten hidden
layers of width 250, over 4 physical nodes as follows. The
physical node n1 hosts one hidden layer, n2 two, n3 three,
and n4 four (also summarized in Table 2).
The dataset is labeled with the 12 activities a patient is per-
forming at a given time, and the task is to classify the type
of activity. We remove the activities that do not belong to
one of the classes. After reprocessing, the dataset contains
343,185 data points and is roughly uniformly distributed
across each class. Hence, we use a standard cross-entropy
loss function for the classification. For evaluation, we sep-
arate data into train, validation, and test with an 80/10/10
split. We use the validation set to select the model with the
highest accuracy, and report performance on the test set.
Vertically distributed CNN: The two architectures in the
right in Fig. 1 present the neural network structur proposed
for these scenarios and how the CNNs are split. For these
scenario, we use two datasets, ImageNet Large Scale Vi-
sual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) and CIFAR-10. We
utilize the ILSVRC dataset for measuring the performance
of ResiliNet in distributed CNNs. However, for ablation
studies for distributed CNNs, we use the CIFAR-10 dataset,
since we run several iterations of experiments with different
hyperparameters. We also employ data augmentation to
improve model generalization.
For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets, we use the Mo-
bileNetV1 CNN architecture (Howard et al., 2017) and
split it across 3 physical nodes. We chose version 1 of
MobileNet (MobileNetV1), as it does not have any of the
skip connections that are present in MobileNetV2. The Mo-
bileNetV1 architecture has 13 “stacked layers”, each with
the following six layers: depth-wise convolution, batch nor-
malization, ReLU, convolution, batch normalization, and
ReLU. We partition these 13 stacked layers across the three
physical nodes: m1 contains three stacked layers, m2 five,
and m3 five plus the remaining layers (average pooling,
dropout, conv2D, and softmax). One of the hyperparame-
ters for MobileNetV1 is the α that adjusts the width of the
CNN by changing the number of filters per layer. α “ 0.75
was chosen in order to have a small enough computational
footprint, while still maintaining a high accuracy. Moreover,
to also consider neural networks with residual connections,
we also experiment with ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016a). The
ResNet-18 architecture has 18 layers, and we partition these
stacked layers across the three physical nodes: z1 contains
four layers, z2 four, and z3 9 plus the remaining layers.
3.2. Experiment Settings
We implemented our experiments using TensorFlow and
Keras on Amazon Web Service EC2 instances. Batch sizes
of 1024, 128, and 1024 are used for the Health, CIFAR-
10, and ImageNet experiments, respectively. The learning
rate of 0.001 is used for the health activity classification and
CIFAR-10 experiments. Learning rate decay with initial rate
of 0.01 is used for the ImageNet experiment. The image size
of 160ˆ160ˆ3 pixels is used for the ImageNet experiment.
The rate of failout for ResiliNet is set to 10% (other rates of
failout are explored later in ablation studies).
We propose three different failure settings outlined in Ta-
ble 2. A failure setting is a tuple, where each element i is
the probability that the physical node vi fails during infer-
ence. The setting Normal represents a reasonable network,
where probability of failure is not arguably low, while the
settings Poor and Hazardous represent failure settings (only
for experiments) when the failures are very frequent in the
physical network. The failure probabilities of physical nodes
are summarized in Table 2. We assume that the top physical
node (n4, m3, z3 in Fig. 1) is the cloud, and hence is always
available.
3.3. Performance Evaluation
Section 3.3 shows the performance of different schemes for
certain physical node failures. The fist two columns show
the failing nodes, along with the probability of occurrence of
those node failures under Normal failure setting. Recall that
Vanilla is a distributed DNN that does not have skip hyper-
connections and does not use failout. We assume that, when
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Failing Top-1 Accuracy (%)
Nodes Prob. (%) ResiliNet+ ResiliNet DFG Vanilla
H
ea
lth
None 87.43 97.85 97.77 97.90 97.85
n1 7.01 97.35 93.26 64.42 7.95
n2 3.64 94.32 95.59 22.49 7.99
n3 0.88 97.74 97.12 92.48 8.10
n1, n2 0.32 8.02 8.12 8.2 7.93
n1, n3 0.08 97.33 91.12 60.13 7.98
n2, n3 0.04 7.99 7.86 7.98 7.97
n1, n2, n3 0.003 7.98 8.11 7.89 7.91
Average 97.36 97.02 92.21 86.57
M
ob
ile
N
et
None 94.08 88.11 87.75 87.54 86.64
m1 3.92 78.98 75.55 69.42 10.27
m2 1.92 75.65 59.18 62.76 9.85
m1,m2 0.08 9.71 10.11 10.02 10.07
Average 87.45 87.46 86.29 82.1
Table 1. Individual physical node failures
there is no information available to do the classification task
due to failures, we do random guessing. ResiliNet+ is a
scheme based on ResiliNet where skip hyperconnections are
always active, during inference (or validation) and training.
(In this table, for MobileNet experiment CIFAR-10 dataset
is used).
(a) Health: In the health activity classification experiment,
we see that the failure of even a single physical node compro-
mises the performance of Vanilla due to random guessing,
resulting top-1 accuracy of around 8%. On the other hand,
DFG, ResiliNet, and ResiliNet+ subvert Vanilla’s inability
to pass data over failed physical nodes, thereby achieving
significantly greater performance. The results also show
that, in this experiment, ResiliNet and ResiliNet+ perform
better than DFG in all of the cases, except for when there is
no failure. In certain physical nodes failures, such as when
n1, n2, or tn1, n3u fail, ResiliNet and ResiliNet+ greatly
surpass the accuracy of the both DFG and Vanilla, provid-
ing a high level of failure-resiliency. When physical node
failures tn1, n2u and tn2, n3u occur, all schemes do not
provide high accuracy, due to inaccessibility of the path for
information flow.
(b) MobileNet on CIFAR-10: In the MobileNet exper-
iment with CIFAR-10 dataset, Vanilla is outperformed
by other three schemes when there is any combination
of failures. ResiliNet and ResiliNet+ both offer a great
performance when m1 fails; nevertheless, DFG performs
marginally better than ResiliNet when m2 fails. ResiliNet+
consistently has the highest accuracy in this experiment.
We can see that ResiliNet overall maintains a higher accu-
racy than DFG and vanilla. We can also see that ResiliNet+
outperforms all of the schemes. However, this benefit comes
at a cost of having the skip hyperconnections always active,
which results in higher bandwidth usage. In the rest of
the experiments, we choose ResiliNet among the two Resi-
liNets. This is a pessimistic choice and it is justified by the
bandwidth savings.
Previously, we discussed and showed how the accuracy is
affected when particular physical nodes fail. Nevertheless,
some of the physical node failures are not as probable as oth-
ers (e.g. multiple physical nodes failure vs. single physical
node failure), and hence it is interesting to see the average
accuracy in different node failure settings. Fig. 2 shows the
average top-1 accuracy of the three methods under different
failure settings, with 10 iterations for the health activity
classification experiment, and 2 iterations for the MobileNet
experiment on ImageNet. Key result 1: as expected, in
both experiments, ResiliNet seems to outperform DFG and
Vanilla. The high performance of ResiliNet is more evident
in severe node failure conditions.
This concludes the discussion of our experiments. In the
next section we explain the state of the art in this direction,
and we position our work’s novelty in the literature.
4. Related Work
The related work in this space can be categorized in the
following groups.
a. Distributed Neural Networks. Federated Learning is a
paradigm that allows clients collaboratively train a shared
global model (Wang et al., 2020; Kairouz et al., 2019;
Bonawitz et al., 2019). Training of distributed neural net-
works has received significant attention (Abadi et al., 2016;
Paszke et al., 2017; Chilimbi et al., 2014). Resilient dis-
tributed training against adversaries are studied in (Chen
et al., 2018; Damaskinos et al., 2019). Nevertheless, in-
ference in distributed neural networks is less explored, pri-
marily due to the emerging application scenarios that need
ongoing and long inference tasks (Teerapittayanon et al.,
2017; Morshed et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2018; Tao and Li,
2018; Hu et al., 2019; Dey et al., 2019).
b. Neural Network Fault Tolerance. A related concept
to failure is fault, which is when units or weights become
defective (i.e. stuck at a certain value, or random bit flip).
Studies on fault tolerance of neural networks date back to
the early 90s, and are limited to mathematical models of
small neural networks (e.g. neural networks with one hidden
layer or unit-only and weight-only faults) (Mehrotra et al.,
1994; Bolt, 1992; Phatak and Koren, 1995).
c. Neural Network Robustness. A line of research re-
lated to our study is robust neural networks (Goodfellow
et al., 2015; Szegedy et al., 2014; Cisse et al., 2017; Bas-
tani et al., 2016; El Mhamdi et al., 2017). Robustness in
neural networks has gained considerable attention lately,
and is especially important when the neural network are to
be developed in commercial products. These studies are
primarily focused on adversarial examples, examples that
are only slightly different from correctly classified examples
drawn from the data distribution. Despite the relation to our
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Table 2. Experiment settings
Experiment Dist. MLP Dist. MobileNet Dist. ResNet-18
Dataset UCI Health ImageNet, CIFAR-10 CIFAR-10
Nodes Order rn4, n3, n2, n1s rm3,m2,m1s rz3, z2, z1s
Failure Setting
Normal r0%, 1%, 4%, 8%s r0%, 2%, 4%s r0%, 2%, 4%s
Poor r0%, 5%, 9%, 13%s r0%, 5%, 10%s r0%, 5%, 10%s
Hazardous [0%, 15%, 20%, 22%s r0%, 15%, 20%s r0%, 15%, 20%s
study, we are not focusing on robustness of neural network
to adversarial examples. We study resiliency of distributed
DNN inference in the presence of failure of a large group of
neural network units. DFG framework in (Yousefpour et al.,
2019) uses skip hyperconnections for failure-resiliency of
distributed DNN inference. We showed how ResiliNet dif-
fers from DFG in skip hyperconnections setup, and in its
novel use of failout to provide even more failure-resiliency.
d. Regularization Methods. Some regularization methods
that implicitly increase robustness are dropout (Srivastava
et al., 2014), dropConnect (Wan et al., 2013), DropBlock
(Ghiasi et al., 2018), zoneout (Krueger et al., 2016), cutout
(DeVries and Taylor, 2017), and stochastic depth (Huang
et al., 2016). Although there are similarities between failout
and these methods in terms of the regularization procedure,
these methods largely differ in spirit from ours. In particu-
lar, although during training, dropout turns off neurons and
dropConnect discards weights, they both enable an ensem-
ble of models for regularization. On the other hand, failout
shuts down an entire physical nodes in a distributed neural
network to simulate actual failures in the physical network,
for providing failure-resiliency. Stochastic depth is a pro-
cedure to train very deep neural networks effectively and
efficiently. The focus of zoneout, DropBlock, and cutout is
on regularizing recurrent neural networks and CNNs, while
they are not designed for failure-resiliency.
5. Conclusion
Federated Learning and Split Learning utilize deep learning
models for training or inference without accessing raw data
from clients. We presented ResiliNet, a framework for pro-
viding failure-resiliency of distributed DNN inference that
combines two concepts: skip hyperconnections and failout.
We saw how ResiliNet can improve the failure-resiliency
of distributed MLPs and distributed CNNs. We also ob-
served experimentally that, the weight of hyperconnections
may not change the performance of distributed DNNs if
the hyperconnections weights are chosen in certain range.
We also observed that the rate of failout should be seen as
a hyperparameter and be tuned. Finally, we observed that
some skip hyperconnections are more critical than others,
especially under more extreme failure scenarios.
Future Work: We view ResiliNet as an important first step
in studying failure-resiliency in distributed DNNs. This
study opens several paths for related research opportunities.
Firstly, it is interesting to study the distributed DNNs that
are both horizontally and vertically distributed. Moreover,
finding optimal hyperconnection weights through training
(not through heuristics) may be a future research direction.
Finally, instead of having only skip hyperconnection to by-
pass a node, we can have a skip layer, a layer to approximate
the neural components of a failed physical node.
Broader Impact
Energy and Resources: ResiliNet may take longer to con-
verge, due to its failout regularization procedure. Moreover,
if a distributed DNN is already trained, it needs to be re-
trained with skip hyperconnections and failout; though, the
training can be done offline. Additionally, some hyper-
parameter tuning may be needed during training. These
training settings depend on the availability of large com-
putational resources that necessitate similarly substantial
energy consumption (Strubell et al., 2019). We did not pri-
oritize computationally efficient hardware and algorithms
in the the experiment. Nevertheless, if ResiliNet is deployed
and is powered by renewable energy and, the impacts of
the hyperparameter tuning will be offset over a long period
of time. Regarding bandwidth usage, ResiliNet+ also in-
creases the use of bandwidth due the the activity of the skip
hyperconnections both during training and failout.
Bias: Secondly, as the large scale deployment of powerful
deep learning algorithms becomes easier and more practical,
the number of new applications that will use the infrastruc-
ture will undoubtedly grow. With the new applications,
there is a risk that model are over-fit and biased to a partic-
ular setting. The bias and over-fit may impact people (e.g.
when the model may not be “fair”), especially when more
people become uses of such applications. Although we do
not provide solutions or countermeasures to these issues,
we acknowledge that this type of research can implicitly
carry a negative impact in the future regarding the issues
described above. Follow-up work focusing on applications
must therefore include this type of consideration.
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6. Supplementary Material
6.1. Different configurations of hyperconnections
In this paper, all of the experiments are conducted on ver-
tically distributed DNNs, as they are more common form
of distributed DNNs. Nevertheless, one could imagine a
distributed DNN that is both vertically and horizontally
distributed. For example, when a DNN is used for image-
based defect detection in a factory or automatic recognition
of parts during product assembly, maybe it is distributed
vertically and horizontally for dispersed presence (Teerapit-
tayanon et al., 2017; Yousefpour et al., 2019).
Figure 3 shows ResiliNet’s different configurations of hy-
perconnections. Figure 3a shows a vertically distributed
DNN, whereas Fig. 3b and Fig. 3c show a distributed DNN
that is both vertically and horizontally distributed. Other
distributed DNN architectures could be constructed based
on the combination of these three hyperconnection configu-
ration. In ResiliNet, skip hyperconnections are active only
during failure or failout; Thus, in Fig. 3, the symbol d
represents this behavior, which is defined as follows: in
y “ x1 d x2, y “ x1, if x1 does not fail, and y “ x2
otherwise. In ResiliNet+, we replace the symbol d with the
symbol ‘.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3. ResiliNet’s configurations of hyperconnections. Boxes
denote physical nodes and arrows denote hyperconnections. The
shaded physical node is the “failed node” that undergoes failure
(during inference) or failout (during training). (a) The failed node
is the only child of its parent and has only one child, (b) The failed
node is not the only child of its parent and has one child, (c) The
failed node is the only child of its parent and has more than one
child.
6.2. Ablation Studies
Now that the validity of failout has been empirically shown
to provide an increase in failure-resiliency of distributed
neural networks, we now investigate the importance of indi-
vidual skip hyperconnections, their weights, as well as the
optimal rate of failout. To do so, we raise four important
questions in what follows, and empirically provide answers
to these questions. We use the CIFAR-10 dataset for ab-
lation studies of the distributed CNN, and use Health for
Table 1
Health MobileNet ResNet Camera
Hazardous 0.09 0.2 0.15 0.74%
Poor 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.80%
Normal 0.44 0.31 0.33 0.17%
No Failure 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.15%
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Health
MobileNet
ResNet
Table 1-1
Health 0.99 0.96 0.92
0 0 0
0.01 0.04 0.08 0.000032 0.0032
Camera 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.02 0.98 0.98 0.02 0.00000372750063840. 0037275006384
CIFAR 0.98 0.96
1 0
0.98 0.04 0.0392 3.92
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Figure 4. Impact of hypercon. weight in ResiliNet
ablation studies of distributed MLPs.
1. What is the best choice of weights for the hyperconnec-
tions? Hyperconnections can have weights, similar to the
weights of the connections in neural networks. We begin
by assessing the choice of weights of the hyperconnections.
Although by default, the weight of hyperconnections in
ResiliNet is 1, we pondered if setting the weights relative
to the reliability of their source physical nodes could im-
prove the accuracy. Reliability of a physical node vi is
ri “ p1´ piq, where pi is the probability of failure of node
vi. We proposed two heuristics, called “Relative Reliability”
and “Reliability,” that are described as follows:
Consider two physical nodes v1 and v2 feeding data through
hyperconnections to physical node v3. If physical node v1
is less reliable than physical node v2 (r1 ă r2), setting
v1’s hyperconnections weight with a smaller value than
that of v2 may improve the performance. Thus, for the
hyperconnection weight connecting node vi to node vj , in
Reliability heuristic, we set wij “ ri, where wij denotes
the weight of hyperconnection from physical node vi to
node vj . Comparably, in Relative Reliability heuristic, we
set wij “ riř
kPHj rk
, where Hj is the set of incoming hyper-
connection indices to the physical node vj .
We experiment with the following four hyperconnection
weight schemes in ResiliNet for 10 runs: (1) weight of 1, (2)
Reliability heuristic, (3) Relative Reliability heuristic, and
(4) uniform random weight between 0 and 1. Key result 2:
surprisingly, all of the four hyperconnection weight schemes
resulted in similar performance. Since all of the values for
average accuracy are similar in these experiments, we report
in Fig. 4 the standard deviation among these weight schemes
in ResiliNet.
We see that the standard deviation among the weight
schemes is negligible, constantly below 1%. This suggests
that there may not be a significant difference in accuracy
when using any of the reasonable weighting scheme (e.g.
heuristic of 1). Key observation 2: we also experimented
with a scheme in which the hyperconnection weight is uni-
formly and randomly distributed between 0 and 10, and
observed that the accuracy dropped significantly for the
distributed MLPs. Key observation 3: surprisingly, the ac-
curacy of distributed CNNs stays in the same range as in
other schemes, when hyperconnection weight is a uniform
random number between 0 and 10. We hypothesize that,
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Table 3. Impact of failout rate in ResiliNet. Numbers represent average top-1 accuracy in %.
Failout Rate Failure 5% 10% 30% 50%
Experiment H M R H M R H M R H M R H M R
Failure Setting
No Failure N/A N/A N/A 97.84 88.23 91.94 97.81 88.53 91.43 97.53 87.75 88.44 96.92 84.60 85.79
Normal 96.32 86.78 89.54 96.64 85.03 89.50 97.07 85.87 88.70 97.04 86.66 86.28 96.52 84.01 84.13
Poor 95.81 81.61 86.16 94.96 80.30 85.81 95.70 81.92 84.59 95.86 84.92 82.97 95.38 82.99 81.55
Hazardous 91.95 77.46 78.60 89.36 70.32 78.82 90.58 73.16 77.03 91.06 79.93 76.97 90.67 79.35 76.65
for distributed MLPs, a reasonable hyperconnection weight
scheme is a scheme that assigns the weights of hyperconnec-
tions between 0 and 1. Nevertheless, further investigation
may be required in different distributed DNN architectures
to assess the full effectiveness of hyperconnection weights.
2. What is the optimal rate of failout? In this ablation
experiment, we investigate the effect of failout by setting
the rate of failout to fixed rates of 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%,
and a varying rate of “Failure,” where the failout rate for
a physical node is equal to its probability of failure during
inference. Table 3 illustrates the impact of failout rate in
ResiliNet. Key result 3: ResNet (R) seems to favor Failure
failout rate, and MobileNet (M) favors higher failout rates of
around 30%.. Key observation 4: we hypothesize that, since
a significant portion of the DNN is dropped during training
when using failout, higher failout rate results in lower ac-
curacy, as opposed to standard dropout. Key observation 5:
based on our preliminary experiments, we conclude that the
optimal failout rate should be seen as a hyperparameter, and
be tuned for the experiment.
3. Which skip hyperconnections are more critical? It is
important to see which skip hyperconnections in ResiliNet
are more critical, thereby contributing more to the resiliency
of the distributed neural network. This is helpful for cer-
tain scenarios in which having all skip hyperconnections
is not possible (e.g. due to cost of establishing new con-
nections, or some communication constraints). To perform
these experiments, we shut down (i.e. disconnect) a cer-
tain configuration of skip hyperconnections while keeping
other skip hyperconnections active and every experiment
setting the same, to see changes in the performance. The
results are presented in Fig. 6. The bar charts show the
average top-1 accuracy of 10 runs, under different “configs”
in which a certain combination of skip hyperconnections
are shut down. The configuration of the present skip hyper-
connections are shown in the tables next to the bar charts.
Letters in the tables indicate the source physical node of the
skip hyperconnection. In the health activity classification
experiment, since there are three skip hyperconnections in
the distributed neural network, there are eight possible con-
figurations of skip hyperconnections (“Config 1” through
“Config 8”). Similarly, in the experiments with MobileNet
and ResNet-18, we consider all four configurations, as we
have two skip hyperconnections.
Config Health + Vanilla ealth + dFG Health + ResiliNet
Low 55.69 81.06 90.63
Medium 75.63 90.38 95.76
High 6.63 94.47 97.14
No-Failure 97.94 97.99 97.85
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(a) Health Experiment
Hazardous Poor Normal NoFailure
Vanilla DFG ResiliNet
Config mobilenet + Vanilla mobilenet + dFG mobilenet + ResiliNet
Low 63.29 75.87 78.845
Medium 77.07 83.21 84.9691666666667
High 83.82 86.67 87.3358666666667
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vg
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(c) MobileNet Experiment
Hazardous Poor Normal NoFailure
1
Figure 5. Average performance under new partition
In the health activity classification (Fig. 6a), we can see a
uniform accuracy gain, when going from Config 1 towards
Config 8. We can also see that, by looking at Config 2
through Config 4, if only one skip hyperconnection is al-
lowed in a scenario, it should be the skip hyperconnection
from input to n2 (labeled as i). This is also evident when
comparing Config 5 and Config 6: the skip hyperconnection
from input to n2 is more critical. In the Hazardous reliabil-
ity scenario, a proper subset of two skip hyperconnections
can achieve up to a 24% increase in average accuracy (Con-
fig 1 vs. Config 6). Key result 4: this hints that individual
skip hyperconnections are more important when there are
more failures in the network.
In the experiment with MobileNet, we also observe a uni-
form accuracy increase, when going from Config 1 towards
Config 4. We can see that the skip hyperconnection from
input to m2 is more critical that the skip hyperconnection
from m1 to m3 (Config 2 vs. Config 3). Nonetheless, if
both skip hyperconnections are present (Config 4), the per-
formance is at its peak. Comparably, in the experiment with
ResNet (Fig. 6c), we can see that the skip hyperconnection
from node z1 to z3 is more critical than the skip hypercon-
nection from input to z2. We can also see that, when we
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Health
Skip Hyper 
Connection 
Config C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
Low 55.62% 63.94% 67.20% 68.47% 75.53% 79.13% 79.90% 90.58%
Medium 75.53% 79.02% 81.96% 85.19% 85.51% 89.27% 91.56% 95.72%
High 86.50% 87.24% 89.59% 93.06% 90.42% 93.92% 96.13% 97.10%
Low STD 0.05% 0.01% 0.11% 0.13% 0.01% 0.17% 0.24% 0.31%
Medium STD 0.06% 0.01% 0.08% 0.13% 0.00% 0.15% 0.22% 0.27%
High STD 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% 0.00% 0.14% 0.13% 0.19% 0.25%
n2, n1, i
0,0,0 1
0,0,1 2
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Poor
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Normal
Failure Setting
MobileNet
Skip Hyper 
Connection 
Config Config 1 none Config 2 e Config 3 iot Config 4 all
Low 61.46% 65.39% 69.90% 74.89%
Medium 74.70% 77.11% 80.03% 82.43%
High 81.19% 83.13% 84.15% 85.76%
Low STD 0.39% 0.39% 0.28% 0.28%
Medium STD 0.39% 0.39% 0.28% 0.28%
High STD 0.39% 0.39% 0.28% 0.28%
m1,i
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1,1
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54%
65%
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(a) Skip Hyperconnection Configuration (Health)
(b) Skip Hyperconnection Configuration (MobileNet)
ResNet
Skip Hyper 
Connection 
Config Config 1 none Config 3 iot Config 2 e Config 4 all
Low 64.46% 67.08% 71.90% 77.88%
Medium 77.85% 79.54% 80.86% 85.27%
High 84.41% 85.37% 85.93% 89.24%
Low STD 0.00% 0.11% 0.28% 0.11%
Medium STD 0.06% 0.14% 0.36% 0.07%
High STD 0.09% 0.33% 0.36% 0.13%
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Connection 
Config C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
Low 55.62% 63.94% 67.20% 68.47% 75.53% 79.13% 79.90% 90.58%
Medium 75.53% 79.02% 81.96% 85.19% 85.51% 89.27% 91.56% 95.72%
High 86.50% 87.24% 89.59% 93.06% 90.42% 93.92% 96.13% 97.10%
Low STD 0.05% 0.01% 0.11% 0.13% 0.01% 0.17% 0.24% 0.31%
Medium STD 0.06% 0.01% 0.08% 0.13% 0.00% 0.15% 0.22% 0.27%
High STD 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% 0.00% 0.14% 0.13% 0.19% 0.25%
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Figure 6. Ablation studies for analyzing sensitivity of ResiliNet’s skip hyperconnections in (a) health activity classification experiment, (b)
MobileNet experiment, (c) ResNet experiment. The charts show average top-1 accuracy (with error bars showing standard deviation). The
tables to the right of the charts show the present skip hyperconnections in each skip hyperconnection configuration. (Notation: letters
indicate the source physical node of the corresponding skip hyperconnection)
have all the skip hyperconnections, the performance of the
distributed DNNs are at their peak.
This ablation study demonstrate that, by searching for partic-
ular critical subset of skip hyperconnections in a distributed
neural network, especially in the Hazardous reliability sce-
narios, we can achieve a large increase in the average ac-
curacy. We point the interested reader to (He et al., 2016b;
Veit et al., 2016) for more information on ablation studies
of skip connections in neural networks.
4. Does different partitions of distributed DNNmatter? In
this subsection, to verify our claims regarding the superior
performance of ResiliNet, we consider different partitions
of DNNs onto distributed physical nodes and measure their
performance. For this ablation study, we consider the dis-
tributed MLP in health activity classification experiment,
and the distributed MobileNet. For the MLP in health activ-
ity classification experiment, instead of the 1Ñ1Ñ2Ñ3Ñ4
partition that we considered in the paper, we experiment
with partition 1Ñ2Ñ3Ñ2Ñ3. For MobileNet, instead of
the 1Ñ3Ñ5Ñ5 partition, we experiment with partition
2Ñ2Ñ4Ñ6.
The results of our experiments with these new two partitions
are depicted in Fig. 5. We can see that, ResiliNet consis-
tently outperforms both DFG and vanilla, and this verify
our claims regarding the superior performance of ResiliNet
in a new distributed DNN partition.
